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Geographies of Trust
JOUNI HÄKLI
Introduction
Trust is a long-term key word in social theory, if less so in human geography. Its
winding conceptual trajectory crosses almost all social scientific disciplines from
political science and political economy to sociology to nursing, with partly
differing  times  of  prominence  in  each.  Early  treatment  of  trust  as  a  part  of
responsible government can be found in the Second Treatise of Government by
John Locke (1690/1980) for whom it was essential that officials do not act
“contrary to trust” (Parry 1976, 131). The significance of trust as a social
condition was noticed in the early 18th century by the father of modern
economics, Adam Smith, for whom it represents a link between the calculative
commercial society and the broader civil society, within which the former was
embedded (Porta 1998, 110). Since Locke and Smith numerous classic texts and
scholarly works have traced the foundation and functioning of social trust (e.g.
Tocqueville 1835/2000; Mill 1848/2006).
Because of its philosophical nature, the concept of trust has received the
most theoretical attention at times when anti-positivistic scholarship has gained a
foothold in human and social sciences. This holds true especially for sociology,
where interest in trust coincides with the rise of the Germanic tradition of
culturally sensitive sociological analysis in the classic scholarship by Georg
Simmel (1858-1918) Werner Sombart (1863-1941) and Max Weber (1864-1920).
Also the latest upsurge of scholarship on trust has gained momentum from the
cultural and linguistic turns in social research.
With roots wide and deep in Western thought, it may be difficult to trace the
different geographical modalities that pertain to the concept of trust. This
difficulty is reflected in the scarce amount of theoretical discussion that exists on
the matter even within human geographical scholarship on trust (e.g. Hudson
1998; Mohan and Mohan 2002). While some attempts to conceptualize the spatial
ramifications  of  social  trust  exist,  there  are  very  few works  that  seek  to  explore
the geographical assumptions that inform theories of trust. Convinced that implicit
geographies of trust can be teased out with a closer examination of the intellectual
and  empirical  contexts  of  the  theories  of  trust,  I  set  out  here  to  explore  this
understudied field.
My aims are threefold. First, I seek to show that the concept of trust is not
the innocent analytical tool it is often taken to be, especially in empirically
oriented research, but part and parcel of the discursive constitution of the
phenomena that these studies strive to describe and explain. Second, I aim to
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make visible some of the spatial assumptions that work in the background of
analytical thought on trust, arguing that these are not merely floating geographical
imaginations, but fundamental systems of signification that influence our
perception of social processes, the shape and nature of political communities, and
the constitution of trust relationships. Third, along with authors such as
Livingstone (1995) and Lorimer (2003), I argue that place matters in the
production of knowledge, and that particular geographical contexts of research
may give rise to thought patterns that universalize the particular by transferring
interpretative schemes from one context to another without due attention paid to
the geography of the process (Häkli 2003; Sidaway 2008).
There are at least three relevant geographies of trust that may be helpful in
the critical re-examination of the significance of the concept for human geography
and  other  social  sciences.  First,  there  is  a paradoxical geography of trust, by
which I mean the fact that through centuries of classic texts in Western political
philosophy, economy and sociology the concept of trust has infiltrated the very
processes  of  democratic  government  and  state  formation  which  constitute  the
political framework of modern societies. Through the loops of such 'double
hermeneutic'  reproduction,  the  geography  of  trust  has  become  almost  generic  to
Western modernity. The term 'double hermeneutics' is used by Anthony Giddens
(1976) in reference to the observation that when scientific concepts become
generally accepted as means of making sense of the society, they not only reflect
but also construct social practices. Likewise trust not only describes but also
construes social practices. Second, I argue that a hidden geography of trust can be
exposed by pointing out the spatial assumptions that concern the form and
function  of  the  political  or  cultural  communities  in  which  trust  is  empirically  or
theoretically analyzed. Third, I want to expose the manner in which a reified
geography of trust has emerged through more than five decades of empirically
based research that has produced an extensive literature assuming that a certain
kind of relationship exists between (Southern) Italian civic culture and political
trust.
I begin this chapter by tracing the conceptual roots of trust and thereby seek
to show the generic nature of the concept in the Western political modernity. I
then  focus  more  on  the  hidden  geographical  dimensions  of  theories  of  trust  and
finally explore the manner in which geography of trust has been reified mainly in
the  context  of  American  political  science  scholarship  on  Italy.  I  conclude  by
discussing contemporary challenges for the analysis of social trust and propose
some avenues for approaching the question in future research.
Why trust matters: The geographical paradox of trust
Much of the recent interest on trust can be attributed to the burgeoning research
on social capital since the early 1990s. The concept has been vital especially in
those strands that follow James Coleman’s (1988) and Robert Putnam’s (1993;
2000) thought, where trust is seen as a resource pertinent to collectives. It is,
however, possible to trace a Western political philosophical discussion of the role
of trust in civil society that extends back much further. In this discussion civil
society has emerged as an important mediating field of social relationships and
action  between  the  individual  or  family  and  the  state.  It  is  this  linkage  that  has
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been  assumed  to  exist  between  trust,  civil  society  and  national  economy,  which
serves as the first of our three avenues for approximating the geographies of trust.
In contrast with Thomas Hobbes (1651/2006) and Adam Ferguson
(1767/1980), for whom civil society was more or less the polity itself, a line of
political philosophical thinking from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1821/1991)
to John Stuart Mill (1848/2006) to Antonio Gramsci (1929-35/1988) up to the
present day (Rawls 1971; Etzioni 1993) has sought an understanding of civil
society in terms of general moral bonds formed between social actors (Porta
1998). These bonds are seen to provide the preconditions for a self-regulating
community that exists between individuals, which is, nevertheless, distinct from
their roles as citizens of the nation-state (Seligman 1992, 6).
Trust figures into this fundamental theory of 'civilized society' as the
indispensable glue that holds the civil society together (Parry 1976, 129). Based
on mutuality and communality between moral human beings, trust exists as the
social and cultural mechanism that balances between unselfish emotions and
rational evaluation, and thus enables private and public interests to coexist (Porta
1998, 110). However, as aptly shown by the complex philosophical discourse on
the relationship between trust and civil society, this relation is far from being
unproblematic. Ambiguity exists, for instance, on whether a high degree of social
trust, and particularly the ensuing consensus among the political elites, is always a
precondition for, or conducive to, good government. Also the question of trust-
based cooperation as a benevolent condition in all circumstances remains a
contested topic (Parry 1976, 130; Gambetta 2000, 214).
Nevertheless, most theoretical accounts of social trust converge on the
principle that a trustful civil society is likely to be better than a distrustful one. At
the interpersonal level, trust among the citizenry may foster cooperation and
beneficial competition necessary for a viable and innovative civil society. At the
macro level, social trust is seen as an important factor in nurturing social
cohesion, strengthening democratic governance and improving the efficiency of
public administration (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Simply put,
trust is considered essential for the functioning of democratic societies for three
reasons. First, the mutual communication required in processes of democratic
deliberation occurs best where citizens trust each other (Seligman 1992). Second,
trust enables citizens to associate together so as to achieve objectives that they
cannot reach individually (Gambetta 2000). Third, a trustful political atmosphere
prevents disputes from escalating into social conflicts that would be difficult and
costly to resolve (Sztompka 1996).
The importance given to interpersonal and social trust for the functioning of
democratic societies explains why the term has become one of the key words in
comparative political science and political sociology (Levi and Stoker 2000). It is
precisely the fear of fading social trust, and the consequent dissolution of the
moral basis of Western political communities, that has given rise to the recent
“call for a return to civil society” (Seligman 1992, 11). This call, also implicit in
much of the theorization of social capital, stresses the need to reassert a sense of
shared communality that is constantly threatened by a growing self-interested
individualism (Seligman 1992, 7).
At stake in the latter concern is not only the moral sustainability of Western
polities but also the conditions for their economic development. As a key element
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in the development of effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts, trust is seen to
foster  efficiency  in  economic  transactions  of  various  kinds.  Hence,  according  to
Kenneth Arrow (1972, 357), “it can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence.” Echoing Arrow’s conviction, Douglas North points to a similar
causality in developing countries, arguing that a lack of social trust is, “the most
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary
underdevelopment in the Third World” (North 1990, 54).
The conceptual intermingling between trust, civil society and national
economy is well captured in the following excerpt from the classic Principles of
Political Economy by John Stuart Mill (1848/2006, 131-132):
Conjoint action is possible just in proportion as human beings can rely on each other.
There are countries in Europe, of first-rate industrial capabilities, where the most
serious impediment to conducting business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of
persons who are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of large
sums of money.
Extrapolated onto the scale of broader society, interpersonal trust and the
social cohesion that it reflects are seen to affect positively both economic
performance and the quality of public government. With higher trust, economic
transactions become more efficient, as there is less need to invest time, effort and
money in establishing written contracts or other kinds of guarantees for business
transactions. Instead the business parties can trust that their interests will not be
violated by each other (Knack and Keefer 1997). The quality of public
government, again, is enhanced by the more acknowledged sense of citizenship
and the lively political participation that characterize high-trust societies. Checked
by active citizens, politicians and bureaucrats are less prone to the sort of
dishonesty that hinders the quality of policy making and lowers the efficiency of
service provision in more corrupt public governments. Moreover, trust among the
citizenry facilitates collective activity that aims at expressing preferences and
exercising demands on government (Gambetta 1988; Tavits 2006).
A veritable magic circle seems to be at work in the relationships between
trust, economic performance and good government. In a much cited article, Knack
and Keefer (1997, 1252-1253) go on to list at least eight beneficial consequences
of  high  degree  of  trust  in  society.  With  reference  to  scholars  such  as  Coleman
(1988), Galor and Zeira (1993) and Putnam (1993), they argue that, first of all,
individuals in high-trust societies spend less on efforts to protect themselves
against unlawful violations of their property rights or exploitation in economic
transactions. Second, entrepreneurs have more time to devote to innovation in
new products or processes as they do not need to invest in monitoring their
partners’ behavior. Third, businesses and governments are less dependent on
formal institutions to enforce agreements. Fourth, politicians and bureaucrats are
perceived as more trustworthy, making their policy pronouncements more
credible. Fifth, this credibility allows individuals to make longer term investment
decisions and technological choices when they know what to expect from the
government and legislation. Sixth, by improving access to credit for the poor, trust
fosters their enrollment in secondary education. Seventh, individuals may enjoy
better performance of government institutions, including publicly provided
education. Eighth, specialized education becomes more valuable to individuals
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when hiring decisions are influenced more by educational credentials than by the
attributed status of applicants, such as through blood ties or personal contacts
(Knack and Keefer 1997, 1252-1253).
Importantly, and paradoxically, the beneficial consequences of trust for both
the economy and the government are rooted in a particular kind of civil society:
one composed of certain kinds of (non)political subjects. In a critical essay on
“Neo-Tocquevillian social theory,” Michael Shapiro (1997) points out that the
contemporary neo-liberal discourses on politics tend to point to the past as a
model of civic life, thus turning a blind eye on today’s multiple forms, modalities
and spaces of politics. In neglecting the present forces of social and political
containment and resistance, as well as the different spatialities through which they
take place, Putnam (1993; 1995) and his followers come to assume that today’s
civil society should still resemble the ideals depicted in Alexis de Tocqueville’s
treatment of the American democracy, as well as in the legacy of Western liberal
political philosophy and praxis that his work helped to shape (Shapiro 1997;
Miztal 2001, 373; Cannone in this volume).
From this follow three key observations concerning the ways in which the
relationship between the concept of trust and geography turns paradoxical. First,
the Putnamian interpretation of trust as a key component of a vibrant civil society
derives largely from a nineteenth century discourse that “assumes a unitary social
order  from  which  citizen  action  is  provoked,  and  restricts  political  action  to
influence on governmental decision makers” (Shapiro 1997). While clearly
resonant with much of contemporary neo-liberal politics and policy making, this
understanding is based on a defunct concept of what counts as political and how
politics is practiced in civil society (Miztal 2001). Second, being rooted in a
political philosophical discourse that has presented itself as the global model, the
idea  of  trust  as  the  glue  that  holds  the  civil  society  together  also  reproduces  an
antiquated understanding of the spatiality of politics. In Shapiro’s (1997) words,
a focus that treats the nation as a whole and presumes the existence of a unitary national
society constitutes an aggressive non-recognition of the variety of incommensurate social
spaces constitutive of the ‘society’ and the variety of different kinds of political enactment
within different social venues.
The third paradoxical aspect in the geographies of trust expands on the
previous two. The importance of social and interpersonal trust for national
economic and governmental performance is prompted by a particular Neo-
Tocquevillean ideal of civil society that, in itself, is deeply rooted in the Western
liberal political philosophy and replicated in the institutional politics of most
Western countries. Owing to this, the concept derives much of its intellectual
thrust and explanatory power from its position in the very apparatus through
which Western political communities are accustomed to make sense of their
conditions of existence, successes and failures.
Herein lies the double-hermeneutical moment of trust: the concept is
constitutive of the phenomena it appears only to describe. Such an uncritically
accepted hermeneutical circle becomes problematic at latest when ideals of civil
society and democracy are forcefully imposed into contexts where their Western
modus operandi is not found. The 'democratization of Iraq' is a case in point.
What for many commentators appears as a “nascent civil society” in Iraq (e.g.
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Rahimi 2008), may also be understood in terms of a long tradition of contestation
between  religious  and  political  authorities,  eschewing  what  the  majority  of  the
Western  world  holds  as  the  key  ideas  of  ‘people’  (demos) holding ‘power’
(kratia). The failure to see the “cultural specificity of civil society” (Schwartz
2003, 2) accounts for many problems that Western countries have encountered in
dealing with the non-Western political world.
The contemporary concept of civil society arises out of a specific historical
experience of modernization in the West, but it does not remain a unique aspect of
Western  society  as  it  can  also  be  found in  other  cultural  contexts.  Bellin  (1995,
121), for example, points out that the term “has entered the discourse of the Arab
world and become a central concept in current Arab debate over the direction of
politics  in  the  region.”  However,  what  remains  obscured  by  this  almost  self-
evident relevance is the fact that it is painfully difficult to specify where the
analytical edge of the concept lies, and whether trust is actually a cause or
consequence of the social and political phenomena it is taken to account for (e.g.
Welch et al. 2005). Coupled with the assumption that the geographical shape of
modern societies can be adequately defined by nation-state territories, the generic
position of trust has acquired a hidden geographical dimension that nevertheless
informs much concrete theoretical and empirical analysis of trust as a social
phenomenon. It is this geography of trust that we shall next turn to.
Taking space for granted: The hidden geographies of trust
The philosophical and theoretical complexity pertaining to the concept of trust has
not rendered concrete analyses and empirical investigations unfeasible. On the
contrary, the recent upsurge in research on social capital has also given a boost to
empirical studies seeking to chart the degree to which people trust, for example,
politicians, the government, societal institutions, foreigners and each other. As a
result, an extensive literature has emerged providing evidence of the degree of
social trust varying from place to place. Typically these studies are based on
analyses of data that has been collected experimentally by means of
questionnaires or structured interviews inquiring about the degree to which the
respondents say they are willing to trust various targets (e.g. nationalities, ethnic
groups, professions, officials, neighborhoods, etc.) (e.g. Rahn et al. 2003). An
increasing number of studies are using survey data collected through
representative samples assessing the climate of trust that exists in specific
societies or communities (e.g. Delhey and Newton 2003). Most empirical studies
have made use of data collected on an individual level and then aggregated for the
purpose of analysis to the level of community, locality, region or nation (Welch et
al. 2005).
While the use of experimental and survey data has been criticized by some
scholars on account of measurement errors (e.g. Miller and Mitamura 2003), or
the poor validity of data caused by sampling errors or response bias (e.g. Knack
2000),  it  has  been  pointed  out  by  others  that  the  results  nevertheless  seem  to
correspond well with outcomes that can be expected on the basis of other data on
the social groups and communities in question (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2000; Delhey
and Newton 2003; Rahn et al. 2003). Hence an extensive literature now exists
indicating differences in the amount of social trust that appear between nations,
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within regions of one country or between communities in one sub-state region or
locally (see, e.g., Robinson and Jackson 2001; Delhey 2007).
Comparative data from cross-national survey projects have yielded results
according to which the level of social trust is higher in certain regions of the
world, such as Scandinavia, and lower in other regions, such as Latin America
(e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997; Inglehart 1990; c.f. Siisiäinen in this volume).
Empirical analyses have detected spatial differences at the sub-state level as well.
Putnam’s (1993) much cited study comparing northern and southern regions in
Italy is a case in point. He later extended the analysis to the United States, with
results indicating a pattern where Southern states show lower levels of social trust
than the states in the Upper Midwest or in the Northeast (Putnam 2000).
While reflecting concern with geographical variation in the amount of
interpersonal or social trust, there are major problems in this literature in terms of
the manner in which trust is assumed to relate to space. The language of empirical
analysis makes the geographies of trust appear quantifiable, showing the ‘degree’
or ‘amount’ of trust that exists within an aggregated data set representing a
smaller or larger territory. A neighborhood’s, region’s or nation’s degree of trust
may, thus,  be read off from survey data measuring trust  directly,  or alternatively
through variables such as ‘associational activity’ or ‘value distance’ used as
shorthand for the existence social trust (e.g. Delhey 2007).
Methodological critique aside (see, e.g., Healy 2002), this approach to
geography hides much more than it reveals. Territorial ‘still images’ that portray
the social world in neatly demarcated geographical parcels, each characterized by
differential levels or degrees of trust, end up misrepresenting the spatial
dynamism  of  social  processes  and  political  landscapes.  In  a  manner  typical  of
quantitative analysis applying spatially aggregated variables, the key problem in
these empirical studies derives from the representation of space as a fixed
container for ‘the social’ – in this case social trust. Assessment of the relationship
between trust and space is limited to regional or national differences in dependent
or independent variables that are assumed to correlate with the measured amount
of trust in a particular way. In other words, space is ultimately seen as local,
regional or national level differences in social variables that are assumed to
explain differences in the degree of social trust. As space, thus, merely ‘contains’
the social, the more dynamic and complex geographical ramifications of trust are
never brought to the foreground, conceptualized or analyzed.
The lack of any serious concern with the geography of trust has been noted
by Welch et al. (2005, 468) who write that:
Although the research to date has yielded a substantial body of findings about how individuals
develop a sense of trust in those with whom they interact, and how trust affects other aspects
of individuals’ behavior, the research literature reveals comparatively little about the forces
that shape trust, and are influenced by it, in group, organizational, and community settings.
They  point  out  that  one  question  especially  deserving  of  researchers’
attention is the ‘radius of trust’ issue first discussed by Fukuyama (1995) and
Wuthnow  (1998).  Both  authors  argue  that  for  Americans  the  radius  of  trust  has
progressively shrunk since the Second World War so that most Americans restrict
their trust primarily to kin or friendship networks (Welch et al. 2005, 469). Yet,
instead of attempting to account for the scalar retraction of the radius of trust,
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Welch  et  al.  (2005)  content  themselves  with  pointing  to  “the  scale  of  human
communities” as a potential source of explanation concerning “conflicts that
might derive from increasing diversity and the changing demographic
composition of a community” with possible effects “on the functioning of civil
society and local institutions” (ibid., 469).
While issuing a notable invitation for further research, Welch et al.
nevertheless fail to indicate where we could start looking for significant inroads
into  the  geographies  of  trust.  Indicative  of  the  reasons  for  this  omission,  they
conclude that the unanswered questions, “all lead to situating trust within the
broader contexts of community and society,” but then elude the question of how
the society or community should be conceived of in geographical terms (Welch et
al. 2005, 470). The theoretical direction they point to then is the taken-for-granted
idea of ‘society’ as a socio-spatial unit defined by nation-state boundaries.
Needless to say perhaps, this direction is but a dead-end street, a cul-de-sac of the
mainstream modern social theory (see Häkli 2001).
The problem of hidden geographies of trust discussed above is intimately
related to the implicit statism of modern social science thinking. The latter refers
to the dominance of the state-territorial conception of ‘society’ in social science
discourses, which have typically failed to address the question of what ‘society’ is
in geographical terms (Agnew 1994; Taylor 1996; Häkli 2001). Unsurprisingly,
this insensitivity to geographical assumptions about society is also present in
literature dealing with the development of civil society in the 19th-century Europe
(e.g. Ehrenberg 1999). While an increasing reflexivity has emerged regarding the
role of the state in the constitution of civil society, the geographical contexts
through which the process is approached –cities, sub-state regions, nations or
societies – are typically addressed in terms of a country defined and demarcated
by the nation-state territory. This is what Taylor (1996, 1920) calls the ‘embedded
statism’ of social scientific research.
Thus it is possible to talk about a hidden geographical agenda in the study
of trust as a key aspect of civil society, where the common assumption still is that
the  state  territory  adequately  describes  the  spatiality  of  this  ‘society’.  Even
analyses that evince differing degrees of ‘civility’ between different parts of a
country fall into this ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994). For example, in arguing that
the Southern Italian civil society is less supportive of efficient government than
that of Northern Italy, Putnam (1993) operates on the assumption that the totality
of the Italian nation-state forms a relevant societal context for comparison. Hence,
what is ‘outside’ of Italy has little or nothing to do with the issue addressed purely
in terms of the dominant geographical imagination of ‘society’.
The consequences of this hidden agenda include ‘nationalization’ of the
study of trust; the indistinct use of the terms nation, country and society; and the
dominance  of  the  country  scale  at  the  expense  of  more  place-specific  or
transnational analyses of social trust (c.f. Agnew 1993, 254; Wallerstein et al.
1996; Taylor 1996). Moreover, as discussed in the previous section dealing with
the paradoxical geography of trust, the consequences of a state-centered concept
of society can not be reduced to social theoretical discourse alone. Attention
should also be paid to the myriad governmental practices that have produced and
reproduced the nation-state as the dominant scale for representing the social world
and framing issues of political importance (Häkli 2001). This social reality
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eventually came to be taken as a given not only in political philosophy and
mainstream social research but also in numerous other spheres of social life,
including governmental practices and the politics of ‘domestic’ non-governmental
organizations and civic associations. This marked the consolidation of the double
hermeneutic circle, linking together the importance of trust for political and
economic viability of a ‘society’, and a nation-state as its territorial container.
Seligman (1992, 10-11) sees this as one of the paradoxes of modern society:
social trust is represented by the universalization of citizenship as the foundation
of moral agency in the public arena secured by the State.
It  is  this  co-construction  of  the  civil  society  and  the  ‘state-society’  that
causes the search for the geographies of trust to remind us of a dog chasing its
tail. Because of the hidden statism in the understanding of civil society, norms of
social trust are already framed in country terms deeply embedded in the politics of
modern governmental and non-governmental institutions. This embeddedness is
based on a shared geographical imagination through which the social world is
enacted: the conception of space as a container for social relations, and ‘society’
as a territorially confined unit defined by the national state.
Little wonder then that even though social trust has been viewed as a
phenomenon pertaining to communities of various sizes and compositions, the
spatial ramifications of trust remain a neglected topic. Empirical studies have
come to  take  administrative  regions  as  their  starting  point,  due  to  availability  of
statistical data or the set up of experimental sampling. This holds true also for
country-level analyses as well as cross-country comparisons: the state territorial
conception of civil society, defined by national boundaries, is largely taken for
granted (see also Brewer et al. 2004).
The persistence of hidden geographies of trust is particularly intriguing in
studies where political spatial units make little sense in understanding the
phenomena in question. Environmental issues are a case in point. But even
International Relations research on international trust  is  typically  based  on
representative national samples, thus operating on the basis of a state-centered
concept of society (e.g. Brewer et al. 2005; Tennberg 2007). However, challenges
to ‘nationalized’ understanding of trust have started to arise on the basis of recent
geopolitical changes, such as transnational networking and new forms of cross-
border governance, both of which have foregrounded emergent new forms of
political space that evade the traditional communities of morality, politics,
involvement and participation (e.g. Kramsch and Hooper 2004).
Indeed, the contemporary interdependent world with local and transnational
processes intertwining and interacting, is calling into question identities, practices
and discourses that were constructed in the context of the modern state-centered
world (Castells 1997; Ley 2004; Staeheli 2008). New geographical imaginations
about society as networks, flows and fluid spaces have started to emerge,
undermining the domination of the Euclidean conception of space as container,
and giving rise to spatial  conceptions and identities that  differ from those of the
previous generations (Mol and Law 1994; Law 2002; Häkli 2008). People engage
in trusting relationships in the context of local and global interconnectedness that
is further reinforced by geographical imaginations produced and reproduced
through “contentious politics” (Leitner et al. 2008) as well as by mobility,
migration, the media and consumer culture (Blunt 2007).
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These new identities and conceptions are negotiated in the flux of everyday
life, but also in the context of state-based institutions and non-governmental
organizations and activities. Hence, the enactment of social trust is a contested
field where the modern state-centered view of the world meets emerging new
identities, discourses and practices connected to, e.g., transnational environmental
concerns, multiculturalism or ‘cosmopolitics’ (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Pickles
2003). New configurations of civic consent and political participation – new
geographies of trust – are being negotiated in the background of processes
whereby different partly overlapping and partly differentiated ‘civil societies’ are
simultaneously emerging.
The challenge of recognizing and unraveling the taken-for-granted
geographies of trust is yet to be fully addressed. This volume is an attempt to
pinpoint and explore some of the issues involved and take tentative steps toward
understanding the complexity of the relationships between geography and the
contested notions of civil society, trust and social capital. But in order to reach our
first approximation of the given ‘geographies of trust’ we must still deal with the
third reduction of geography in the analysis of social trust: the reification of space
as the embodiment of ‘trust culture’.
What makes society ‘civil’: The geographical reification of trust
Attempts to explain governmental and economic performance by social and
cultural means have a long history in social thought. A body of knowledge that
began as a ruminative discussion of political philosophy in works by authors such
as Thomas Hobbes (1651/2006) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/2000) was taken
to a different level in the groundbreaking analysis of Western political and
economic development by Max Weber (1905/1985). His sociological mode of
thinking has encouraged generations of scholars to study the role of civic culture
and social life in the function of political and governmental institutions.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s this interest reappeared forcefully in the
context of sociologically oriented political science as practiced by James Coleman
(1988), and Robert Putnam (1993). While Coleman carried out his empirical work
with a focus mainly on the United States, Putnam’s study showcased Italy as an
emblematic case for analyzing the cultural embeddedness of political and
governmental phenomena. Putnam, however, was not the first to take an analytical
look at Italian civic culture. His work was preceded by more than four decades of
political science experimentation using Italy as a geographical laboratory for
testing theories and developing argumentation concerning political cultures, and
later, geographies of (dis)trust.
The origins of this interest in the political life of Italy may be attributed to
the country’s peculiar political history and many internal divisions. It is also
possible to speculate, however, about more personal reasons for this interest,
tracing back to Charles Edward Merriam, an influential American political
scientist who served as the American high commissioner of public information in
Italy during the First World War. In the words of Gabriel Almond (1996, 1)
Merriam was the “head of American propaganda efforts in Italy where he dealt
with the lagging morale of that country in its conduct of the war … trying to
prevent  Italy  from  going  the  way  of  Russia.”  This  experience  gave  rise  to
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Merriam’s thought concerning the central role of what he termed ‘civic education’
in  fostering  civic  solidarity.  He  developed  a  clear  sense  that  the  problem  of
nation-building stood at the heart of political democratization, and that various
techniques of controlled dissemination of ideas and manipulation of popular
symbols might be used effectively in the process (Oren 2000, 98).
Significantly,  after  the  war  Charles  Merriam  returned  to  the  United  States
and took over the Political Science Department of University of Chicago, giving
rise to a pioneering behavioral strand in political science (Almond 2004). Among
the dozens of PhD’s that this unit trained were such comparative politics scholars
as Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, all of whom contributed to the
placement of Italian society under a political scientific looking glass. Merriam’s
own research resulted in a volume called The Making of Citizens that sought to
perform a comparative analysis of civic cohesion and civic training systems in
France, Germany, England, Italy, Soviet Russia, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland,
and the United States (Merriam 1931). At least partly inspired by the differing
performances  of  the  countries  involved  in  World  War  I,  it  nevertheless  failed  to
develop an overarching theory and was relatively soon forgotten (Almond 1996).
However, it may well be Merriam’s personal experience in Italy during the First
World War that spurred the extensive American scholarly interest in that
country’s political culture in the decades that followed.
The idea of civic associations as a key factor in local development was first
addressed by political scientist Edward Banfield (1958) in his study The Moral
Basis of a Backward Society, focusing on the political life of a small community
in southern Italy. The study sought to explain the community’s relative
underdevelopment by going back to “amoral familism”, i.e. a dominant ethos
favoring the maximizing of short-term material advantage for the nuclear family
instead of furthering the interests of the group or community (Banfield 1958, 85).
In spite of an initially controversial reception, this book it has served as an
inspiration for much subsequent work, including the much cited research Civic
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations by Almond and
Verba (1963) – an attempt to discern the key determinants of political equilibrium
in properly functioning democracies. They found that interpersonal trust plays a
central role in the formation of secondary associations, which in turn, are essential
for democratic participation. Moreover, they concluded that:
[…] our own data will tend to support Banfield’s claim that the Italian political culture
contains unusually strong parochial, alienative subject, and alienative participant components
[… evidencing a] widespread mood of rejection that affects the attitudes of the great majority
of Italians toward their political system in all its aspects (Almond and Verba 1963, 38).
Hence, the study showed that the level of interpersonal trust was relatively
low among Italian respondents,  indicting a prevailing condition of distrust  in the
country.  Moreover, they argued that “each kind of polity – traditional,
authoritarian and democratic – has one form of culture that is congruent with its
structure” (Almond and Verba 1963, 33). Thus there had once been established
cultural patterns which possessed considerable autonomy and could influence
subsequent political and economic development.
Echoing these observations, Joseph La Palombara (1965) interpreted
statistics showing high degrees of dissatisfaction with the government in Italy to
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be an indication of widespread political alienation. He argued that one reason for
this lay in the rigid system of social stratification in Italy. Low social mobility has
formed class-based social barriers which, over several centuries, have become
institutionalized, with an impact on Italian political culture that La Palombara
(1965, 315) describes as follows:
[…] the stratification system aids and abets notions of extreme class conflict, contributes to a
sense of futility that spills over into men's attitudes toward and evaluation of the political
system, and helps to perpetuate patterns of leadership in the legislature and bureaucracy that
are direct causes of disdain and hostility toward the political system.
La Palombara (1965) comes to the distressing conclusion that in the Italian
society mistrust is so pervasive that it prevents any of the co-operative
undertakings necessary for civilized existence.
Since the mid-1960s a broad Anglophone literature has emerged on the
Italian political system (e.g. Hennessy 1969; Graziano 1973; Morlino 1984;
Woods 1992). Yet, in terms of impact on scientific discussions concerning the
relationships between trust, civil society and political culture, Robert Putnam’s
(1993) study Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy stands
out as a landmark. More than three decades after the classic text by Edward
Banfield, Putnam and his associates Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti argued
that democracies work better when supported by a long-standing tradition of civic
engagement with public affairs (see Cannone in this volume).
The basic idea is that when individuals act together in local associations and
other informal contexts, they create generalized trust as a by-product, thus
generally improving the ‘civicness’ of the civil society. This is assumed to form
an important public resource that influences not only the citizen’s quality of life
but also economic development, political cooperation and governmental
performance. Using various indicators of policy implementation, Putnam showed
that Northern Italian regions perform better than Southern regions, and found that
these observations correlated with data on distrust and dissatisfaction reflecting
the differing degrees of ‘civility’ in Italian regions (Putnam 1993, 63-83).
Putnam’s study has been criticized for several omissions and weaknesses,
including failure to distinguish between policy activism and administrative
efficiency as aspects of government performance, and a myopic account of Italian
political history (Sabetti 2002; Tavits 2006). Moreover, his conception of civil
society has been found too voluntaristic and devoid of conflict, or in the words of
Mouritzen (2003, 664), “pacific, functionalist and self-propelling [growing]
spontaneously where there is civic soil…”. Thus, in vesting the idea of civil
society  with  civic  virtues  such  as  trust,  sense  of  duty,  solidarity  and  public-
spiritedness,  Putnam comes  to  neglect  the  existence  and  value  of  conflict.  In  so
doing he diverts from those conflictual aspects of civil society that may spur or
constitute civility by teaching citizens to accept confrontation and compromise as
the cement of the political condition (cf. Edwards and Foley 1998; Mouritzen
2003; Cannone in this volume).
The legacy of research into Italian political culture, as represented in the
above studies, shares more than the idea of Italy as political culture characterized
by  some  degree  of  alienation.  Above  all,  it  shows  a  strong  tendency  of  relating
trust to geography in a very particular way. Scholarly interest in the political
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development of Italian society, partly set in motion by American geopolitical
concerns after the World War I, was progressively built up on the basis of an idea
of territorially confined political culture which, instead of illuminating the ways
in which space is involved in political processes, merely ended up reifying it.
Reification as defined by Gordon Marshall (1998) in the Dictionary of
Sociology refers to:
The error of regarding an abstraction as a material thing, and attributing causal powers to it –
in other words the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. An example would be treating a model
or ideal type as if it were a description of a real individual or society.
In the case of representing Italy the abstraction vested with misplaced
concreteness is political culture conceived of as a territorial geography of trust.
Starting  with  Merriam (1931),  and  probably  before,  research  on  the  Italian  civil
society has related political culture to space in territorial terms, seeking to attain
convenient shorthand for enduring national or sub-state regional differences in
what Fukuyama (1995) has termed “trust culture”. The constitution of these trust
relationships is then conceptualized in terms of virtuous civic spaces defined as
arenas of face-to-face interactions, such as voluntary associations (Foley and
Edwards 1999).
While simplifying the overwhelming complexity of the social world for
analytical purposes, this moment of reification comes at a price. It imposes social
clarity, cultural transparency and spatial distinction upon socio-cultural processes
and settings that are characterized by historical and scalar complexity. By
foregrounding civil society as a regional entity defined by the nation-state ‘Italy’,
or a sub-state spatial unit ‘Southern Italy’, this strand of comparative politics has
ended up in a theoretical cul-de-sac where the dynamism of civil society as a
social process and contested accomplishment is overshadowed by the idea of
relatively stable and clear-cut geography of trust.
The reified geography of Italian (dis)trust has not only produced moribund
political theory, but it has also shifted attention away from key questions, such as,
“What is the civil in civil society?” (Mouritzen 2003, 650). By representing civil
society as a homogeneous field of social space glued together by generalized trust,
the analysis has rendered invisible vital aspects in the multi-scalar constitution of
civic  engagement  that  could  better  be  grasped  in  terms  of  relational  or  fluid
spatiality. These include manifold active or emerging social movements that
challenge established forms of political participation by engaging people in civic
activism that escapes any pre-set territorial arenas (e.g. Edelman 2001; Leitner et
al. 2008). This significant area of civic activism in itself underscores the fact that
there exists no coherent civil society that could be isolated from class and interest-
group differentiation and then thought of, in Putnamian manner, as disinterested
towards contemporary socio-economic hierarchies and power geometries (Shapiro
1997; Mouritzen 2003).
Ramifications of the geographical reification of trust run wider than just
simplified accounts of the multifaceted political cultures in Italy. The
understanding of civil society as a territorially circumscribed cradle for civility,
where “feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged and the understanding
developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another” (Tocqueville
1835/2000 cited in Putnam 1993, 90), makes the concept fundamentally apolitical
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by associating it with civilized manners. However, as Mouritzen (2003, 664) aptly
points out, civil societies are created and may be lost.
We should certainly reflect on the concept at a time when globalization and localization
challenge the format of nation states. Such forces require us to concentrate on the cool,
political and conflict-accepting character of civil society […] And we need ways to maintain
broad political identities which treat nations as neither ‘functioning’ systems nor vessels of
culture. Putnam’s intervention is a symptom of the fact that civil societies are fragile
accomplishments.
Instead of reifying trust as a spatially circumscribed resource for the
common good, we should seek theoretical inroads into understanding the
specifically  situated  historical  organization  of  social  and  political  space  that
provides people with uneven opportunities to enact and practice their civic
engagements. We should re-think trust as an aspect of pervasive and differentiated
civic engagement that arises, not through virtuous behavior, but in connection
with the multi-scalar and complex politics of everyday life.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored ways in which geography has figured into attempts
in the social sciences to understand and conceptualize trust-related phenomena.
This exploration led to the unveiling of three distinct, yet interrelated, geographies
of trust: paradoxical, hidden and reified. What these geographies have in common
is their taken for granted nature, that is, received understanding concerning space
as the container of ‘the social,’ coupled with assumptions about the manner in
which trust is related to spatiality. It is these implicit geographical aspects of trust
that I have sought to unravel in this chapter.
My first take on the geographies of trust led me to suggest that any attempt
to locate or pinpoint trust in modern societies is somewhat paradoxical because
the concept is part of the very means by which modern polities have been
constituted and by which we make sense of these same societies. Trust is deeply
embedded in more than two centuries of modern political philosophy, underlying
democratic institutions and civil society, informing both the ways in which
governmental institutions function in relation to the ‘sphere’ of civil society and
the ways in which their achievements are assessed. It is precisely the latter
aspiration that has given rise to the flood of empirical studies charting the amount
or degree of trust that people are willing to invest either in their political
institutions or the citizens of their neighboring countries (e.g., World Value
Surveys).
While apparently paying attention to the explicit geographical variation in
trust-related phenomena, this research interest has, in reality, worked to hide
rather than illuminate the geographies of trust. Even though social trust has been
viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to communities of various sizes and
compositions, empirical studies have taken administrative regions as their starting
point, thus assuming that space is best understood as the container of differential
amounts of trust. The state territorial conception of civil society, defined by
international boundaries, is predominantly taken for granted also in country-level
analyses and international cross-country comparisons. The spatial assumptions
that prevail in empirical studies of trust have not been adequately addressed in this
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research strand, and therefore, what seems an assessment of geographical
variation merely works to conceal the spatial complexity pertaining to social trust.
I termed the third taken-for-granted spatiality of trust a reified geography.
The term refers to the manner in which some geographical settings have been
made showcase examples and emblematic cases of (dis)trust. I illustrated this
reification by discussing the long legacy of reductionist uses of ‘Italian society’,
and particularly its North/South division, in arguing for a particular Tocqueville-
inspired understanding of the relationship between trust, civil society and
economic or governmental performance. Arguing against the appealing simplicity
of this theoretical model, I share the critical concern according to which such a
reductionist reading of Italian society is highly problematic (Cannone in this
volume).
In this article I have not been able to go much beyond a tentative
exploration of the three given geographies of trust, but I have discussed some
aspects of the development of contemporary societies that further undermine the
relevance of paradoxical, hidden and reified understandings of geographies of
trust.  I  argue  that  the  dominance  of  the  nation-state  as  the  frame  for  political
change and cultural signification is being eroded by the growing interdependence
with local and transnational processes intertwining and interacting. Along with
authors such as Shapiro (1997) and Mouritzen (2003), I maintain that this
development is gradually calling into question identities, practices and discourses
that were constructed in the context of the modern state-centered world order.
Evincing this, new geographical configurations and imaginations about society as
networks, flows and fluid spaces have started to emerge, calling into question “the
lazy certainties of the geometrical intuitions” (Bachelard 1994, 220).
Consequently, social trust is now being enacted in the context of new figurations
of contentious politics embedded in geographies of trust that defy simple
measurable Euclidean spatiality.
To grasp these challenging geographical configurations of trust it is
necessary to re-think the notion of civil society. In this chapter I have argued that
civil society should not be conceived of as ‘being’ as much as ‘becoming’. In
other words, civil society should not be understood as a circumscribed entity that
can be socio-spatially isolated from the market and the state for analytical
purposes.  Rather  it  is  best  understood  as  a  multi-layered  and  multi-scalar  social
accomplishment that relates to different spatialities in highly complex ways. In
terms of topological spatialities discussed by Mol and Law (1994) and Law
(2002), we can conceive of civil society and the relationships of trust it involves
as co-constituted through different interconnected yet unconformable spatialities,
such as scaled, regional, networked and fluid spaces (Leitner et al. 2008; Jessop et
al. 2008). These spatial types are not to be understood as mutually exclusive
ontologies, but rather as abstractions deriving from different modalities that
pertain to various kinds of institutional and individual action, including the agency
of the “more-than-human world” (Whatmore 2006, 602).
Indeed, if we take seriously the idea of civil society as a site of political
contention  rather  than  an  oasis  of  civic  consent,  as  I  think  we  should,  then  we
must strive to trace its ‘becoming’ in all possible political encounters between
agents, locales, institutions, objects and events – whatever shape and content these
may  take.  It  is  these  “multivalent  and  co-implicated  spatialities  of  contentious
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politics” that Leitner et al. (2008, 158) propose as the challenging object for the
study of contentious politics that “challenges dominant systems of authority, in
order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries.” This formulation clearly
parallels the idea of civil society presented here, even though their use of the
concept points to a regrettably categorical understanding of civil society as
distinguishable from “the state” and “the market” (Leitner et al. 2008, 157). To
push forward the analysis of the geographies of trust it is imperative to open up
the concept of civil society and explore its co-constitution with hegemony-
challenging contentious politics. It is equally crucial to ask what role, if any,
relationships of individual and social trust play in these processes, and how the
agents of contentious politics tactically perform and strategically bend different
unconformable, yet interrelated spatialities.
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